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INSURGENCY IN A SMALL COUNTRY, ETHNIC REVOLT IN SRI LANKA

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The protracted insurgency in Sri Lanka is a vicious by-product of prolonged ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka's majority Sinhala Community and the minority Tamil Community. The current wave of violence can be traced back to the early 1970s, when a group of Sri Lankan Tamil politicians who had lost power in an election began to campaign earnestly for an independent Tamil State. Their rhetoric against the Sinhala community and the government in Colombo galvanized a few employed and under-employed Tamils to take up arms against the state. The formative phase of violence inspired by Tamil nationalism was directed against fellow Tamils who did not support the idea of a separate state; these victims included Tamil politicians, police officers, government officials and suspected informants. Sri Lanka's armed forces were incapable of meeting the militant threat during this period, not unsurprisingly, given that they were primarily trained to perform ceremonial functions. By the time the military was able to transform itself into a professional fighting force, the militants had developed a mastery of guerrilla warfare. The bloody ethnic riots of July 1983 1 , a watershed in the history of Sri Lanka polarized the two communities 2 and were a reaction of a FIGURE 1. JAFFNA PENINSULA segment of the majority community to the deaths of 13 soldiers in an ambush by the most formidable Tamil militant group -the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Prior to July 1983, all efforts by Tamil insurgent groups and their representatives to raise money overseas to sustain a war had been unsuccessful. It was only after July 1983,with the exodus of over 100,000 Tamil refugees and another equal number of displaced persons that gave birth to a distinct Tamil Diaspora.
6 By the end of 1983,there were over 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu alone and this number would swell up to nearly 200,000 with the escalation of the conflict. The exodus to the west was equally intense. Many countries in the west, sympathetic to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils would revise their immigration and emigration policies vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. As a consequence, the number of refugees, mostly economic but in the guise of political asylum seekers, would bring the totality of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora to over 450,000. Within three months, the LTTE broke the cease-fire and declared war on the government, and executed 400 Sinhala policemen who had surrendered. This seemed to confirm the theory that the LTTE always uses periods of peace to gain International recognition, disseminate propaganda, generate funds, procure supplies, gather intelligence, regroup, retrain and recruit.
After a decade of battle the LTTE had grown from a small force of 3,000 in 1986 to 16,000 in 1996. Sri Lanka witnessed the emergency and the systematic elimination of 30 Tamil groups by the LTTE, as well as the death of 100,000 people, mostly civilians (including southern killings).
The LTTE also eliminated the alternative Tamil 
EVOLUTION OF THE LTTE
With the expansion of the LTTE network overseas, the LTTE domestic structure has grown in strength and sophistication. Yet, some features of the LTTE never changed. Despite several offers for international mediation and attractive propositions both by India and Sri Lanka to resolve the political question, the LTTE remained rigid in its stand on Tamil Eelam.
In many ways, the LTTE did not evolve but revolved. At the heart of it was Prabakaran, an Although the death of Prabakaran will be a massive blow to the LTTE, the middle level leadership of the LTTE is equally or more motivated than its senior level leadership. History shows that organizations like the LTTE cannot be easily eradicated. Despite their inability to meet their avowed goals and the massive sufferings they have brought upon the Tamil public, segments of the Tamil people still believe in them and support them. For some, particularly for those who had lost a loved one during the ethnic riot or killed by a soldier, Prabakaran is a demi-god. They also believe that if they die fighting for their cause, they will be treated like saints by the Tamil society. 
CHAIN OF COMMAND
The LTTE organization is geographically structured into seven regular commands under special district commanders responsible to Prabhakaran. In the LTTE, all members are fighting cadres and do not receive remuneration. The exceptions are only to a handful who plays an advisory or supportive role. The cadres of the seven commands 21 belong broadly to political and military wings and are further sub-divided according to the specialist roles they play. In the LTTE are departments for political, military, intelligence, Sea Tigers, women, finance and procurement activity.
Cadres are given responsibility not according to seniority but strictly on performance.
Cadres are not promoted to a rank but only responsibilities of command. Cadres are ranked only posthumously by taking into account their service, as well as the circumstances of their death.
ROLE AND DEPLOYMENT
Politically the LTTE attempts to control parts of the northeast by providing a reasonably well-managed administration. The Sri Lankan state continues to provide essential items to citizens, even in LTTE controlled areas, to prevent a humanitarian crisis. 22 Controlling territory helps the LTTE to radicalize the Tamil public into supporting the LTTE by providing finance and recruits. The LTTE legitimates its military action by providing the international community the idea that Tamil people are being deliberately discriminated against, as a matter of policy of the Colombo government. The LTTE forces engage the Sri Lankan military deployments in the northeast by labeling them an 'army of occupation'.
FIGURE 5 -MAP OF SRI LANKA
The LTTE goal is to achieve an independent Tamil state by the year 2003. To establish greater control over intelligence, the pre-requisites for establishing an independent state, the LTTE has launched plans to create a 'Tamil Only' northern province. To meet that objective, the LTTE has systematically engaged in a program of ethnic cleansing, driving out non Tamils from the Northern Province. Today, with the exception of the security forces and the civilians engaged in the administration of Jaffna, there are no Sinhalese and Muslims in the Northern
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Province except in Weli Oya. In the Eastern Province, where the LTTE frequently targets civilian villages, the population ratio of Tamils to Muslims to Sinhalese is almost equal.
To weaken the morale of the Sri Lankan state and to neutralize any Tamil political opposition, the LTTE engages in assassinating prominent leaders of all communities and senior military commanders. The LTTE also assassinated many powerful Sinhala political and military leaders, including;
• The minister of state for defense, General Ranjan Wijeratne (suicide car bomber)
• The former national security minister Lalith Athulathmudali (assassination)
• The presidential candidate and minister, Gamini Dissanayake (female suicide bomber)
• Navy commander Clancy Fernando (motorcycle suicide bomber)
• Army generals Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Wijaya Wimalaratna and Lakshman Wijeratna (land mines).
To prevent dissent, the LTTE maintains a number of prisons and execution programs.
Among the LTTE leaders to be executed were Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah, alias Ajith Mahattaya, and long-time deputy leader of the LTTE and a childhood friend of Prabhakaran. In addition to conducting deep penetration and front-line intelligence operations, the LTTE intelligence wing headed by Potto Amman is also responsible both for internal security and counter-intelligence.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE
The International community's response to transnational insurgency has been weak. The Although the international community will never allow a major inter state war, the international community should realize that intrastate wars have significant spill over effects that can complicate regional and international security to a very high degree. The 21 st century insurgent groups will be very different from the twentieth century insurgents. Until recently, technology doubled every 25 years. Today, technology doubles every year. If not regulated and controlled, insurgents empowered by sub national groups will begin to use technology the same way governments use them. After the end of the Cold War, the porosity of the boundaries has transformed the international system dramatically. Countries cannot live in isolation any more.
What will ensure the security of a nation-state is not only internal stability but the stability of one's neighbor and the region. Therefore, security of the 21 st century will have to be cooperative and collective and not isolationist and individual.
OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE
The LTTE has developed its own distinctive operational art and tactical doctrine, but it is still one largely drawn from past masters, Che Guevara, Giap, Mao and Debray. The LTTE doctrine is flexible enough to exploit the opportunities that arise from time to time.
As a highly innovative force, the LTTE is capable of retaliation against aggressions reprisals and pre-emptive strikes. Regular features of the LTTE doctrine are the unleashing of widespread terror on soft targets. Concentrating on lightly or unprotected targets is a classic diversionary tactic in warfare pinning down troops to static sentry/bunker duties and restraining search and destroy operations. The LTTE has bombed Sri Lankan commercial aircrafts, trains and buses, gunned down priests, nuns, pilgrims and bystanders in a sacred royal city and shot Muslims while worshipping in mosques, frequently raided non Tamil border villages and towns, massacring men, women and children, and land mined, ambushed and assaulted military and police patrols and posts.
Battle hardened LTTE cadres are deployed to strike heavily fortified military targets. The LTTE has vast experience in limited action against Sri Lankan forces and is highly developed in the art of mobile warfare. Over the years, the LTTE, both in terms of unconventional and semiconventional capability, has grown. It is currently developing its conventional force capability. The LTTE international network operates in at least 40 countries. International propaganda and fund-raising is mostly coordinated by LTTE leaders based both in the UK and France, mostly through the following fronts:
• World Tamil Movement
• International Federation of Tamils
• International Secretariat of the LTTE.
The LTTE procurement, barcodes and shipping networks remain classified, although ships frequently move between Turkey, Ukraine and Myanmar/Thailand via Mullaitivu in northern Sri Lanka.
TRAINING
The LTTE has kept its membership small, but invested heavily in training and discipline, greater command and control and ideological indoctrination and psychological war training.
War training and fighting is a must for all cadres ranging in age from 14 to 40. The Tamil Tiger code compels its rank and file to abstain from alcohol, smoking and extramarital sex. The penalty for violation is instant death. The strength of the LTTE also lies in the potassium cyanide capsule strung around the neck of every male or female cadre. When capture is imminent, the LTTE code mandates its consumption. The broken glass pierces the gum and poison permeates into the bloodstream, thus assuring an instant, painless death. Such martyrs would, along with Hindu gods and goddesses, be eulogized and venerated.
Initially trained in the desolate farms and jungle hideouts of northern Sri Lanka, and later
by Farad (1977) Including the light weapons procured by the LTTE from overseas as well as those provided by Indian (`1983-87) and Sri Lankan governments , the LTTE possessed about 15,000 light weapons. The LTTE has acquired long range artillery from strikes on Sri Lankan military camps from 1993 onwards. This includes one army tank and at least four high-speed water jet boats. The LTTE also has a fleet of between 500 and 1,000 fiber glass boats and between six and 10 mirage class boats. The LTTE has between 50 and 100 frogman kits and five to 10 underwater scooters. Although not used in the past, the LTTE has five micro light plane kits and at least five gliders. The LTTE emphasizes the improvisation of technology to enhance their military capability. Suicide bomb technology has undergone unprecedented innovation under the guidance of the LTTE. In 1997 at least 125 suicide bomb kits were in the possession of the LTTE. Latest intelligence indicate that the LTTE has been developing an explosive-laden light aircraft -that does not carry sufficient metal for radar detection -to accurately strike a political, military or economic target aided by a global positioning system. Because of the seizure of a mini-submarine under LTTE construction in Tamil Nadu India, the LTTE is now planning to purchase a mini-submarine from an Eastern European state.
KNOWN ARMS AND SUPPLIERS/ROUTES
In August 1983, in Salonika, Greece, two West Germans were sentenced to four years imprisonment on charges of illegal transport of arms and ammunition, by a transport plane which took off from East Berlin and landed in Salonika. The plane was headed for Sri Lanka, where the LTTE was scheduled to pick up the 267 cases in the plane which contained 300,000 rounds of automatic rifle ammunition and 400 rockets.
According to intelligence reports, most of the arms used by the LTTE are purchased from Singapore, India, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Soviet-made AK47 automatic Kalashnikovs, T56 Chinese assault rifles, the Indian-Belgian AKMS, and the M16 manufactured by the Colt company in the United States (believed to have been obtained by way of Vietnam) have been the common weapons of the LTTE guerrillas.
In the late 1980s and early 1990, the LTTE is known to have received weapons from munitions factories in India. In 1990, the LTTE was receiving small weapons from factories in the Tamil Nadu centers of Ranipet, Cimbuatore, Salem, and Trichengode.
In 1987, the Hindustan Times reported that large quantities of arms with Pakistani and Israeli markings were seized by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Jaffna from the LTTE.
In 1989, according to a Sri Lankan government secretary, the LTTE was receiving armaments directly from the Sri Lankan government of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who wanted to force the expulsion of the Indian Peacekeeping Force from Sri Lanka, and who was also using the LTTE to wipe out the JVP (People's Liberation Front) Sinhala insurgency.
In November 1991, the Indian Navy seized a large ship carrying large amounts of arms, ammunition, and clothes from Singapore to the LTTE.
In October 1993, the Indian daily "The Pioneer" charged that Pakistan had been clandestinely supplying arms to the LTTE, from a location close to the Karatchi port. Sources in Dubai said this arms supply line was uncovered when an Indian naval vessel intercepted the LTTE ship "MV Yahata Maru" on January 16, 1993. In November 1994, the Sri Lankan government asked the Indian Navy to intercept a suspected arms shipment to the LTTE, believed to be 10 tons of arms and explosives coming from a "Black Sea port."
The LTTE has now acquired radar guided anti-aircraft missiles, according to July 1995 reports. The LTTE reportedly has bought Russian-made Strela anti-aircraft missiles from
Belgian arms dealers. It is likely that the LTTE threat to Sri Lankan and Indian security will be maintained.
ASSESSMENT
Despite the frequent pronouncements of political and military leaders, the LTTE will remain a formidable force until the government of Sri Lanka either develops force structures sufficient to destroy the LTTE militarily or accepts international offers to mediate a negotiated settlement, paving the way for the entry of the LTTE into the legitimate political arena.
Sinhala only policy 30 of the government was the reason for the Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.
The LTTE ideology is Tamil nationalism but it draws heavily on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.
The Tiger symbol is derived from the emblem of the expansionist Indian Tamil Chola dynasty.
Its 43-years old charismatic leader and military commander, 31 Velupillai Prabhakaran (whose nom de guerre is Karikalan), is a highly disciplined, dedicated, self-taught, military genius.
The LTTE's role has been to break the will of the Sri Lankan state into conceding the northeast to the LTTE. To this end, the LTTE engaged the government politically and militarily.
In 1997 Lanka. This was the most expensive military cargo, the LTTE had ever transported. To save high registration costs, the ships are registered in the flag giver countries of Panama, Honduras, and Liberia, affectionately known as "Pan-ho-lib."
Although the LTTE has lost India as an operational base, it has expanded its extraregional operational capability by procuring several ocean-going vessels. Worldwide operations in support of the insurgency propaganda, fund-raising, procurement of military hardware and transportation -is de-stabilizing the international arena. The LTTE is a role model and a trendsetter for existing and emerging terrorist groups in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
Internationally, the LTTE has not only been active politically and economically. Their extensive political and economic presence has enabled them to be militarily active as well. The LTTE understood quite early that in order to expand their political and economic power base, they will have to strengthen their legal as well as extralegal capability outside Sri Lanka.
Although small in number, the LTTE has assassinated Tamils in Europe, North America and in South Asia. Today, at least the Law enforcement agencies of three European governments particularly prohibit Sri Lankan Tamils from carrying weapons on themselves.
Governments in the Asia-Pacific region believe that that LTTE is emerging as a major destabilizing force. As a group, the LTTE is at the cutting edge of technology. In Sri Lanka, the first rocket propelled grenade launcher was recovered from a LTTE camp. 2 Sinhala and Tamil communities.
3 Velupillai Prabakaran is the current leader in Sri Lanka. Oxford University-trained Anton Balasingham, residing in London and Paris, is the public spokesman for the LTTE. Pottu Amman is the LTTE intelligence chief and Sooriya Kumaran Selvadurai is the LTTE leader in ( west) Germany, who is reputed to be a multi-millionaire drug dealer.
4 Southern State capital of India. Only 36 miles away and a 45-minute cruise by a speed boat.
5 Majority of presence are in Canada, Australia, US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavia.
6
By examining other Diaspora communities, the Sri Lankan Tamil expatriate community formed following the 1983 riots, can be classified as a Diaspora. Today, the pre-and the post-1983 Sri Lankan Tamil émigrés are hardly distinguishable. Therefore, both groupings can be collectively identified as the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.
17 Jaffna was recaptured in the year 1995 and the government control was established in the northern capital.
18 Where the maximum number of IPKF soldiers were killed.
19 The explosion at the Central Bank of Ceylon.
20 An Artillery gun belonging to the Sri Lanka Army was captured by the LTTE. 21 Mostly located in Mullaitivu.
22 Most of the food is forcibly taken over by the LTTE cadres, yet the government dispatches food to the uncontrolled areas.
23 Location of the famous one four base. IPKF had two companies massacred in location. 24 Mostly located in Weli-Oya and Mullaitivu.
25 First terrorist organization to use the human bomb.
26 Most hitherto generated propaganda would only polarize the two communities. By calling the LTTE "terrorists" and Tamil expatriates "their supporters," Sinhalese would become more nationalistic and Tamils more determined to fight for a separate Tamil state. Propaganda has not been conducted in Tamil. Recent study by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense suggest that propaganda should (a)sympathize with the plight of the Tamil community (b)highlight the criminal wastage of Tamil lives and resources at the hands of Prabhakaran (c) list all the Tamil leaders have been exterminated by the LTTE (d) predict that there will be no democracy under the LTTE (e)assess that India will never allow Tamil Eelam to be established and (f)call for an alternate Tamil leadership.
27 Has a child brigade in its organization.
28 President Premadasa of Sri Lanka and Premier Rajiv Gandhi of India.
29 The Indian Navy.
30 Sinhala was made the official language of the country by the 1956 Bandaranaike regime.
31 No formal education. Born to a fisherman family in a village called Velvettiturai in the Jaffna peninsula.
32 Information obtained from the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB).
33 Trading in narcotics generate huge profits. The LTTE paid for the SAMs-US $ 1 million a piece-from narcotic profits. Although the governments of the Philippines, India, Germany, Italy, and Canada, have records of LTTE narcotics couriers, the Sri Lankan government is yet to unearth substantial information. This is confirmed by reviewing a report by Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of narcotics PB Seneviratne submitted to Ambassador Philip Wilcox, coordinator counter terrorism, US State Department, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo in 1996. Large consignments of brown sugar have been transported by the LTTE
